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Abstract
For the past decade, query processing on relational data has been studied extensively, and many theoretical and
practical solutions to query processing have been proposed under various scenarios. With the recent popularity of
cloud computing, users now have the opportunity to outsource their data as well as the data management tasks to the
cloud. However, due to the rise of various privacy issues, sensitive data (e.g., medical records) need to be encrypted
before outsourcing to the cloud. In addition, query processing tasks should be handled by the cloud; otherwise, there
would be no point to outsource the data at the first place. To process queries over encrypted data without the cloud
ever decrypting the data is a very challenging task. In this paper, we focus on solving the k-nearest neighbor (kNN)
query problem over encrypted database outsourced to a cloud: a user issues an encrypted query record to the cloud,
and the cloud returns the k closest records to the user. We first present a basic scheme and demonstrate that such a
naive solution is not secure. To provide better security, we propose a secure kNN protocol that protects the confi-
dentiality of the data, user’s input query, and data access patterns. Also, we empirically analyze the efficiency of our
protocols through various experiments. These results indicate that our secure protocol is very efficient on the user
end, and this lightweight scheme allows a user to use any mobile device to perform the kNN query.
Keywords: Security, k-NN Query, Encryption, Cloud Computing
1 Introduction
As an emerging computing paradigm, cloud computing attracts many organizations to consider utilizing the benefits of
a cloud in terms of cost-efficiency, flexibility, and offload of administrative overhead. In cloud computing model [13,
16], a data owner outsources his/her database T and the DBMS functionalities to the cloud that has the infrastructure
to host outsourced databases and provides access mechanisms for querying and managing the hosted database. On
one hand, by outsourcing, the data owner gets the benefit of reducing the data management costs and improves the
quality of service. On the other hand, hosting and query processing of data out of the data owner control raises security
challenges such as preserving data confidentiality and query privacy.
One straightforward way to protect the confidentiality of the outsourced data from the cloud as well as from the
unauthorized users is to encrypt data by the data owner before outsourcing [1, 15, 19]. By this way, the data owner
can protect the privacy of his/her own data. In addition, to preserve query privacy, authorized users require encrypting
their queries before sending them to the cloud for evaluation. Furthermore, during query processing, the cloud can
also derive useful and sensitive information about the actual data items by observing the data access patterns even if
the data and query are encrypted [4, 27]. Therefore, following from the above discussions, secure query processing
needs to guarantee (1) confidentiality of the encrypted data (2) confidentiality of a user’s query record and (3) hiding
data access patterns.
Using encryption as a way to achieve data confidentiality may cause another issue during the query processing step
in the cloud. In general, it is very difficult to process encrypted data without ever having to decrypt it. The question
here is how the cloud can execute the queries over encrypted data while the data stored at the cloud are encrypted at
all times. In the literature, various techniques related to query processing over encrypted data have been proposed,
including range queries [2, 11, 12, 24] and other aggregate queries [10, 17]. However, these techniques are either not
applicable or inefficient to solve advanced queries such as the k-nearest neighbor (kNN) query.
In this paper, we address the problem of secure processing of k-nearest neighbor query over encrypted data (SkNN)
in the cloud. Given a user’s input query Q, the objective of the SkNN problem is to securely identify the k-nearest
data tuples to Q using the encrypted database of T in the cloud, without allowing the cloud to learn anything regarding
the actual contents of the database T and the query record Q. More specifically, when encrypted data are outsourced
to the cloud, we observe that an effective SkNN protocol needs to satisfy the following properties:
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Table 1: Sample Heart Disease Dataset T
record-id age sex cp trestbps chol fbs slope ca thal num
t1 63 1 1 145 233 1 3 0 6 0
t2 56 1 3 130 256 1 2 1 6 2
t3 57 0 3 140 241 0 2 0 7 1
t4 59 1 4 144 200 1 2 2 6 3
t5 55 0 4 128 205 0 2 1 7 3
t6 77 1 4 125 304 0 1 3 3 4
• Preserve the confidentiality of T and Q at all times
• Hiding data access patterns from the cloud
• Accurately compute the k-nearest neighbors of query Q
• Incur low computation overhead on the end-user
In the past few years, researchers have proposed various methods [13,28,31] to address the SkNN problem. However,
we emphasize that the existing SkNN methods proposed in [13, 28] violate at least one of the above mentioned desir-
able properties of a SkNN protocol. On one hand, the methods in [13, 28] are insecure because they are vulnerable to
chosen and known plaintext attacks. On the other hand, recent method in [31] returns non-accurate kNN result to the
end-user. More precisely, in [31], the cloud retrieves the relevant encrypted partition instead of finding the encrypted
exact k-nearest neighbors. Furthermore, in [13, 31], the end-user involves in heavy computations during the query
processing step. By doing so, the method in [31] utilizes cloud as just a storage medium, i.e., no significant work is
done on the cloud side. More details about the existing SkNN methods are provided in Section 2.
Along this direction, with the goal of providing better security, this paper proposes a novel SkNN protocol that
satisfies the above properties altogether.
1.1 Problem Definition
Suppose the data owner Alice owns a database T of n records, denoted by t1, . . . , tn, and m attributes. Let ti,j
denote the jth attribute value of record ti. In our problem setting, we assume that Alice initially encrypts her database
attribute-wise, that is, she computes Epk(ti,j), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m, where Epk denotes the encryption
function of a public-key cryptosystem that is semantically secure [18]. Let the encrypted database be denoted by
Epk(T ). We assume that Alice outsources Epk(T ) as well as the future querying processing services to the cloud.
Consider an authorized user Bob who wants to ask the cloud for k-neighbor records that are closest to his input
query Q = 〈q1, . . . , qm〉 based on Epk(T ). During this process, Bob’s query Q and contents of database T should
not be revealed to the cloud. In addition, the access patterns to the data should be protected from the cloud. We
refer to such a process as Secure kNN (SkNN) query over encrypted data in the cloud. Without loss of generality, let
〈t′1, . . . , t
′
k〉 denote the k-nearest records to Q. Then, we formally define the SkNN protocol as follows:
SkNN(Epk(T ), Q)→ 〈t′1, . . . , t′k〉
We emphasize that, at the end of the SkNN protocol, the output 〈t′1, . . . , t′k〉 should be revealed only to Bob. We now
present a real-life application of the SkNN protocol.
Example 1. Consider a physician who would like to know the risk factor of heart disease in a specific patient. Let
T denote the sample heart disease dataset with attributes record-id, age, sex, cp, trestbps, chol, fbs, slope, ca, thal,
and num as shown in Table 1. The description and range for each of these attributes are shown in Table 2. The heart
disease dataset given in Table 1 is obtained from the UCI machine learning repository [14].
Initially, the data owner (hospital) encrypts T attribute-wise, outsources the encrypted database Epk(T ) to the
cloud for easy management. In addition, the data owner delegates the future query processing services to the cloud.
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Table 2: Attribute Description of Heart Disease Dataset T
age age in years
sex 1=male, 0=female
cp chest pain type: 1=typical angina, 2=atypical angina,
3=non-anginal pain, 4=asymptomatic
trestbps resting blood pressure (mm Hg)
chol serum cholesterol in mg/dl
fbs fasting blood sugar > 120 mg/dl (1=true; 0=false)
slope slope of the peak exercise ST segment
(1=upsloping, 2=flat, 3=downsloping)
ca number of major vessels (0-3) colored by flourosopy
thal 3=normal, 6=fixed defect, 7=reversible defect
num diagnosis of heart disease from 0 (no presence) to 4
Now, we consider a doctor working at the hospital, say Bob, who would like to know the risk factor of heart disease
in a specific patient based on T . Let the patient medical information be Q = 〈58, 1, 4, 133, 196, 1, 2, 1, 6〉. In the
SkNN protocol, Bob first need to encrypt Q (to preserve the privacy of his query) and send it to the cloud. Then the
cloud searches on the encrypted database Epk(T ) to figure out the k-nearest neighbors to the user’s request. For
simplicity, let us assume k = 2. Under this case, the 2 nearest neighbors to Q are t4 and t5 (by using Euclidean
distance as the similarity metric). After this, the cloud sends t4 and t5 (in encrypted form) to Bob. Here, the cloud
should identify the nearest neighbors of Q in an oblivious manner without knowing any sensitive information, i.e., all
the computations have to be carried over encrypted records. Finally, Bob receives t4 and t5 that will help him to make
medical decisions. 
1.2 Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a novel SkNN protocol to facilitate the k-nearest neighbor search over encrypted data in the
cloud that preserves both the data privacy and query privacy. In our protocol, once the encrypted data are outsourced to
the cloud, Alice does not participate in any computations. Therefore, no information is revealed to Alice. In particular,
the proposed protocol meets the following requirements:
• Data confidentiality - Contents of T or any intermediate results should not be revealed to the cloud.
• Query privacy - Bob’s input query Q should not be revealed to the cloud.
• Correctness - The output 〈t′1, . . . , t′k〉 should be revealed only to Bob. In addition, no information other than
t′1, . . . , t
′
k should be revealed to Bob.
• Low computation overhead on Bob - After sending his encrypted query record to the cloud, Bob involves
only in a little computation compared with the existing works [13,28,31]. More details are given in Section 4.2.
• Hidden data access patterns - Access patterns to the data, such as the records corresponding to the k-nearest
neighbors of Q, should not be revealed to Alice and the cloud (to prevent any inference attacks).
We emphasize that the intermediate results seen by the cloud in our protocol are either newly generated randomized
encryptions or random numbers. Thus, which data records correspond to the k-nearest neighbors ofQ are not known to
the cloud. In addition, after sending his encrypted query record to the cloud, Bob does not involve in any computations
(less workload at Bob’s local machine). Hence, data access patterns are further protected from Bob. More details are
given in Section 4.2.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the existing related work and some background concepts
in Section 2. A set of security primitives that are utilized in the proposed protocols and their possible implementations
are provided in Section 3. The proposed protocols are explained in detail in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the
performance of the proposed protocols based on various experiments. We conclude the paper along with future work
in Section 6.
2 Related Work and Background
In this section, we first present an overview of the existing secure k-nearest neighbor techniques. Then, we present the
security definition adopted in this paper and the Paillier cryptosystem along with its additive homomorphic properties
as a background.
2.1 Existing SkNN Techniques
Retrieving the k-nearest neighbors to a given query Q is one of the most fundamental problem in many application
domains such as similarity search, pattern recognition, and data mining. In the literature, many techniques have been
proposed to address the SkNN problem, which can be classified into two categories based on whether the data are
encrypted or not: centralized and distributed.
2.1.1 Centralized Methods
In the centralized methods, we assume that the data owner outsources his/her database and DBMS functionalities
(e.g., kNN query) to an untrusted external service provider which manages the data on behalf of the data owner where
only trusted users are allowed to query the hosted data at the service provider. By outsourcing data to an untrusted
server, many security issues arise, such as data privacy (protecting the confidentiality of the data from the server as
well as from query issuer). To achieve data privacy, data owner is required to use data anonymization models (e.g.,
k-anonymity) or cryptographic (e.g., encryption and data perturbation) techniques over his/her data before outsourcing
them to the server.
Encryption is a traditional technique used to protect the confidentiality of sensitive data such as medical records.
Due to data encryption, the process of query evaluation over encrypted data becomes challenging. Along this direction,
various techniques have been proposed for processing range [2, 11, 12, 24] and aggregation queries [10, 17] over
encrypted data. However, in this paper, we restrict our discussion to secure evaluation of kNN query.
In the past few years, researchers have proposed different methods [13,28,31] to address the SkNN problem. Wong
et al. [28] proposed a new encryption scheme called asymmetric scalar-product-preserving encryption (ASPE) that
preserves scalar product between the query vector Q and any tuple vector ti from database T for distance comparison
which is sufficient to find kNN. In [28], data and query are encrypted using slightly different encryption schemes
before outsourcing to the server. As an alternative, Hu et al. [13] proposed a method based on Privacy Homomorphism
(PH) encryption scheme. More specifically, they used a provably secure privacy homomorphism encryption scheme
from [5] that supports modular addition, subtraction and multiplication over encrypted data. They addressed the SkNN
problem under the following setting: the client has the ciphertexts of all data points in database T and the encryption
function of T whereas the server has the decryption function of T and some auxiliary information regarding each data
point. However, both methods in [13, 28] are not secure because they are vulnerable to chosen-plaintext attacks. We
refer the reader to [31] for more details on these security issues.
Recently, Yao et al. [31] designed a new SkNN method based on partition-based secure Voronoi diagram (SVD).
Instead of asking the cloud to retrieve the exact kNN, they required, from the cloud, to retrieve a relevant encrypted
partition Epk(G) for Epk(T ) such that G is guaranteed to contain the k-nearest neighbors of Q. However, in our
work, we are able to solve the SkNN problem accurately by letting the cloud to retrieve the exact k-nearest neighbors
of Q (in encrypted form). In addition, most of the computations during the query processing step in [13, 31] are
performed locally by the end-user (i.e., query issuer) which conflicts the very purpose of outsourcing the DBMS
functionalities to the cloud. Since our proposed protocol solves the problem of finding k-nearest neighbors of Epk(Q)
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over encrypted data, it can also be used in other relevant data mining tasks such as secure clustering, classification,
and outlier detection.
2.1.2 Data Distribution Methods
In the data distributed methods, data are assumed to be partitioned either vertically or horizontally and distributed
among a set of independent, non-colluding parties. In the literature, the data distributed methods rely on secure
multiparty computation (SMC) techniques that enable multiple parties to securely evaluate a function using their
respective private inputs without disclosing the input of one party to the others. Many efforts have been made to
address the problem of kNN query in a distributed environment. Shaneck et al. [23] proposed privacy-preserving
algorithm to perform k-nearest neighbor search. The protocol in [23] is based on secure multiparty computation for
privately computing kNN points in a horizontally partitioned dataset. Qi et al. [20] proposed a single-step kNN search
protocol that is provably secure with linear computation and communication complexities. Vaidya et al. [25] studied
privacy-preserving top-k queries in which the data are vertically partitioned. Ghinita et al. [6] proposed a private
information retrieval (PIR) framework for answering kNN queries in location-based services. However, their solution
protects only the query privacy, i.e., it does not address data confidentiality and access pattern issues.
We emphasize that the above data distribution methods are not applicable to perform kNN queries over encrypted
data for two reasons: (1). In our work, we deal with encrypted form of database and query which is not the case in the
above methods (2). The database in our case is encrypted and stored on the cloud whereas in the above methods it is
partitioned (in plaintext format) among different parties.
2.2 Security Definition
In this paper, privacy/security is closely related to the amount of information disclosed during the execution of a
protocol. There are many ways to define information disclosure. To maximize privacy or minimize information
disclosure, we adopt the security definitions in the literature of secure multiparty computation (SMC) first introduced
by Yao’s Millionaires’ problem for which a provably secure solution was developed [29,30]. In this paper, we assume
that parties are semi-honest; that is, a semi-honest party (also referred to as honest-but-curious) follows the rules of
the protocol using its correct input, but is free to later use what it sees during execution of the protocol to compromise
security. We refer the reader to [7, 8] for detailed security definitions and models. Briefly, the following definition
captures the above discussion regarding a secure protocol under the semi-honest model.
Definition 1. Let ai be the input of party Pi,
∏
i(pi) be Pi’s execution image of the protocol pi and bi be the result
computed from pi for Pi. pi is secure if
∏
i(pi) can be simulated from 〈ai, bi〉 and distribution of the simulated image is
computationally indistinguishable from∏i(pi).
2.3 Paillier Cryptosystem
The Paillier cryptosystem is an additive homomorphic and probabilistic asymmetric encryption scheme [18]. Let Epk
be the encryption function with public key pk given by (N, g), where N is a product of two large primes and g is in
Z
∗
N2 . Also, let Dsk be the decryption function with secret key sk. Given a, b ∈ ZN , the Paillier encryption scheme
exhibits the following properties:
a. Homomorphic Addition - Epk(a+ b)← Epk(a) ∗ Epk(b) mod N2;
b. Homomorphic Multiplication - Epk(a ∗ b)← Epk(a)b mod N2;
c. Semantic Security - The encryption scheme is semantically secure [8, 9]. Briefly, given a set of ciphertexts, an
adversary cannot deduce any additional information about the plaintext.
In this paper, we assume that a data owner encrypted his or her data using Paillier cryptosystem before outsourcing
them to a cloud. Some common notations that are used extensively in this paper are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3: Common Notations
Alice The data owner of database T
Epk(T ) Attribute-wise encryption of T
Bob An authorized user who can access Epk(T ) in the cloud
n Number of data records in T
m Number of attributes in T
ti i
th record in T
Q Bob’s query record
t′i i
th nearest record to Q based on T
l Domain size (in bits) of the squared Euclidean distance
based on T
〈z1, zl〉 The most and least significant bits of integer z
[z] Vector of encryptions of the individual bits of z
3 Basic Security Primitives
In this section, we present a set of generic protocols that will be used as sub-routines while constructing our proposed
SkNN protocol in Section 4.2. All of the below protocols are considered under two-party semi-honest setting. In
particular, we assume the existence of two semi-honest parties P1 and P2 such that the Paillier’s secret key sk is
known only to P2 whereas pk is treated as public.
• Secure Multiplication (SM) Protocol:
This protocol considers P1 with input (Epk(a), Epk(b)) and outputs Epk(a ∗ b) to P1, where a and b are not
known to P1 and P2. During this process, no information regarding a and b is revealed to P1 and P2. The output
Epk(a ∗ b) is known only to P1.
• Secure Squared Euclidean Distance (SSED) Protocol:
P1 with input (Epk(X), Epk(Y )) and P2 securely compute the encryption of squared Euclidean distance be-
tween vectors X and Y . Here X and Y are m dimensional vectors where Epk(X) = 〈Epk(x1), . . . , Epk(xm)〉
and Epk(Y ) = 〈Epk(y1), . . . , Epk(ym)〉. At the end, the output Epk(|X − Y |2) is known only to P1.
• Secure Bit-Decomposition (SBD) Protocol:
P1 with input Epk(z) and P2 securely compute the encryptions of the individual bits of z, where 0 ≤ z < 2l.
The output [z] = 〈Epk(z1), . . . , Epk(zl)〉 is known only to P1. Here z1 and zl denote the most and least
significant bits of integer z respectively.
• Secure Minimum (SMIN) Protocol:
P1 with input ([u], [v]) and P2 with sk securely compute the encryptions of the individual bits of minimum
number between u and v. That is, the output is [min(u, v)] which will be known only to P1. During this
protocol, no information regarding u and v is revealed to P1 and P2.
• Secure Minimum out of n Numbers (SMINn) Protocol:
In this protocol,P1 hasn encrypted vectors ([d1], . . . , [dn]) andP2 has sk. Here [di] = 〈Epk(di,1), . . . , Epk(di,l)〉
such that di,1 and di,l are the most and least significant bits of integer di respectively, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. P1 and P2
jointly compute the output [min(d1, . . . , dn)]. At the end of this protocol, [min(d1, . . . , dn)] is known only to
P1. During the SMINn protocol, no information regarding any of di’s is revealed to P1 and P2.
• Secure Bit-OR (SBOR) Protocol:
P1 with input (Epk(o1), Epk(o2)) and P2 securely compute Epk(o1 ∨ o2), where o1 and o2 are two bits. The
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Algorithm 1 SM(Epk(a), Epk(b)) → Epk(a ∗ b)
Require: P1 has Epk(a) and Epk(b); P2 has sk
1: P1:
(a). Pick two random numbers ra, rb ∈ ZN
(b). a′ ← Epk(a) ∗ Epk(ra)
(c). b′ ← Epk(b) ∗ Epk(rb); send a′, b′ to P2
2: P2:
(a). Receive a′ and b′ from P1
(b). ha ← Dsk(a′); hb ← Dsk(b′)
(c). h← ha ∗ hb mod N
(d). h′ ← Epk(h); send h′ to P1
3: P1:
(a). Receive h′ from P2
(b). s← h′ ∗ Epk(a)N−rb
(c). s′ ← s ∗ Epk(b)N−ra
(d). Epk(a ∗ b)← s′ ∗ Epk(ra ∗ rb)N−1
output Epk(o1 ∨ o2) is known only to P1.
We now discuss each of these protocols in detail. Also, we either propose new solution or refer to the most efficient
known implementation to each one of them.
Secure Multiplication (SM). Consider a party P1 with private input (Epk(a), Epk(b)) and a party P2 with the secret
key sk. The goal of the secure multiplication (SM) protocol is to return the encryption of a ∗ b, i.e., Epk(a ∗ b) as
output to P1. During this protocol, no information regarding a and b is revealed to P1 and P2. The basic idea of the
SM protocol is based on the following property which holds for any given a, b ∈ ZN :
a ∗ b = (a+ ra) ∗ (b+ rb)− a ∗ rb − b ∗ ra − ra ∗ rb (1)
where all the arithmetic operations are performed under ZN . The overall steps in SM are shown in Algorithm 1.
Briefly, P1 initially randomizes a and b by computing a′ = Epk(a) ∗ Epk(ra) and b′ = Epk(b) ∗ Epk(rb), and sends
them to P2. Here ra and rb are random numbers in ZN known only to P1. Upon receiving, P2 decrypts and multiplies
them to get h = (a + ra) ∗ (b + rb) mod N . Then, P2 encrypts h and sends it to P1. After this, P1 removes extra
random factors from h′ = Epk((a + ra) ∗ (b + rb)) based on Equation 1 to get Epk(a ∗ b). Note that, for any given
x ∈ ZN, “N − x” is equivalent to “−x” under ZN . Hereafter, we use the notation r ∈R ZN to denote r as a random
number in ZN .
Example 2. Suppose a = 59 and b = 58. For simplicity, let ra = 1 and rb = 3. Initially, P1 computes
a′ = Epk(60) = Epk(a) ∗ Epk(ra), b
′ = Epk(61) = Epk(b) ∗ Epk(rb) and sends them to P2. Then, P2 de-
crypts and multiplies them to get h = 3660. After this, P2 encrypts h to get h′ = Epk(3660) and sends it to P1. Upon
receiving h′, P1 computes s = Epk(3483) = Epk(3660−a∗ rb), and s′ = Epk(3425) = Epk(3483− b∗ ra). Finally,
P1 computes Epk(a ∗ b) = Epk(3422) = Epk(3425− ra ∗ rb). 
Secure Squared Euclidean Distance (SSED). In the SSED protocol,P1 holds two encrypted vectors (Epk(X), Epk(Y ))
andP2 holds the secret key sk. HereX and Y are twom-dimensional vectors whereEpk(X) = 〈Epk(x1), . . . , Epk(xm)〉
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Algorithm 2 SSED(Epk(X), Epk(Y ))→ Epk(|X − Y |2)
Require: P1 has Epk(X) and Epk(Y ); P2 has sk
1: P1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m do:
(a). Epk(xi − yi) ← Epk(xi) ∗ Epk(yi)N−1
2: P1 and P2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m do:
(a). Compute Epk((xi − yi)2) using the SM protocol
3: P1:
(a). Epk(|X − Y |2)←
∏m
i=1Epk((xi − yi)
2)
andEpk(Y ) = 〈Epk(y1), . . . , Epk(ym)〉. The goal of the SSED protocol is to securely computeEpk(|X−Y |2), where
|X − Y | denotes the Euclidean distance between vectors X and Y . During this protocol, no information regardingX
and Y is revealed to P1 and P2. The basic idea of SSED follows from following equation:
|X − Y |2 =
m∑
i=1
(xi − yi)
2 (2)
The main steps involved in SSED are shown in Algorithm 2. Briefly, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, P1 initially computesEpk(xi−yi)
by using the homomorphic properties. Then P1 and P2 jointly compute Epk((xi − yi)2) using the SM protocol, for
1 ≤ i ≤ m. Note that the outputs of the SM protocol are known only to P1. After this, by applying homomorphic
properties on Epk((xi − yi)2), P1 computes Epk(|X − Y |2) locally based on Equation 2.
Example 3. Refer to Table 1, let us assume that P1 holds the encrypted data records of t1 and t2 as X and Y
respectively. That is, Epk(X) = 〈Epk(63), Epk(1), Epk(1), Epk(145), Epk(233), Epk(1), Epk(3), Epk(0), Epk(6),
Epk(0)〉 and Epk(Y ) = 〈Epk(56), Epk(1), Epk(3), Epk(130), Epk(256), Epk(1), Epk(2), Epk(1), Epk(6), Epk(2)〉.
During the SSED protocol, P1 initially computes Epk(x1− y1) = Epk(7), . . . , Epk(x10− y10) = Epk(−2). Then, P1
andP2 jointly computeEpk((x1−y1)2) = Epk(49) = SM(Epk(7), Epk(7)), . . . , Epk((x10−y10)2) = SM(Epk(−2),
Epk(−2)) = Epk(4). P1 locally computes Epk(|X − Y |2) = Epk(
∑10
i=1(xi − yi)
2) = Epk(813). 
Secure Bit-Decomposition (SBD). We assume that P1 has Epk(z) and P2 has sk, where z is not known to both
parties and 0 ≤ z < 2l. The goal of the secure bit-decomposition (SBD) protocol is to compute the encryptions of
the individual bits of binary representation of z [21,22]. That is, the output is [z] = 〈Epk(z1), . . . , Epk(zl)〉, where z1
and zl denote the most and least significant bits of z respectively. At the end, the output [z] is known only to P1.
Since the goal of this paper is not to investigate existing SBD protocols, we simply use the most efficient SBD
protocol that was recently proposed in [21].
Example 4. Let us suppose that z = 55 and l = 6. Then the SBD protocol with private input Epk(55) gives
[55] = 〈Epk(1), Epk(1), Epk(0), Epk(1), Epk(1), Epk(1)〉 as the output to P1. 
Secure Minimum (SMIN). In this protocol, P1 with input ([u], [v]) and P2 with sk securely compute the encryptions
of the individual bits of min(u, v), i.e., the output is [min(u, v)]. Here [u] = 〈Epk(u1), . . . , Epk(ul)〉 and [v] =
〈Epk(v1), . . . , Epk(vl)〉, where u1 (resp., v1) and ul (resp., vl) are the most and least significant bits of u (resp., v). At
the end, the output [min(u, v)] is known only to P1.
We assume that 0 ≤ u, v < 2l and propose a novel SMIN protocol. The basic idea of the proposed SMIN protocol
is for P1 to randomly choose the functionality F (by flipping a coin), where F is either u > v or v > u, and to
obliviously execute F with P2. Since F is randomly chosen and known only to P1, the output of the functionality F is
oblivious to P2. Based on the output and chosen F , P1 computes [min(u, v)] locally using homomorphic properties.
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Algorithm 3 SMIN([u], [v])→ [min(u, v)]
Require: P1 has [u] and [v], where 0 ≤ u, v < 2l; P2 has sk
1: P1:
(a). Randomly choose the functionality F
(b). for i = 1 to l do:
• Epk(ui ∗ vi) ← SM(Epk(ui), Epk(vi))
• if F : u > v then:
– Wi ← Epk(ui) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)
N−1
– Γi ← Epk(vi − ui) ∗ Epk(rˆi); rˆi ∈R ZN
else
– Wi ← Epk(vi) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)
N−1
– Γi ← Epk(ui − vi) ∗ Epk(rˆi); rˆi ∈R ZN
• Gi ← Epk(ui ⊕ vi)
• Hi ← H
ri
i−1 ∗Gi; ri ∈R ZN and H0 = Epk(0)
• Φi ← Epk(−1) ∗Hi
• Li ← Wi ∗ Φ
r′i
i ; r
′
i ∈R ZN
(c). Γ′ ← pi1(Γ)
(d). L′ ← pi2(L); send Γ′ and L′ to C
2: P2:
(a). Receive Γ′ and L′ from P1
(b). Mi ← Dsk(L′i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l
(c). if ∃ j such that Mj = 1 then α← 1
else α← 0
(d). M ′i ← Γ′iα , for 1 ≤ i ≤ l
(e). Send M ′ and Epk(α) to P1
3: P1:
(a). Receive M ′ and Epk(α) from P2
(b). M˜ ← pi−11 (M ′)
(c). for i = 1 to l do:
• λi ← M˜i ∗ Epk(α)
N−rˆi
• if F : u > v then Epk(min(u, v)i) ← Epk(ui) ∗ λi
else Epk(min(u, v)i)← Epk(vi) ∗ λi
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The overall steps involved in the SMIN protocol are shown in Algorithm 3. To start with, P1 initially chooses the
functionality F as either u > v or v > u randomly. Then, using the SM protocol, P1 computes Epk(ui ∗ vi) with the
help of P2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Now, depending on F , P1 proceeds as follows, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l:
• If F : u > v, compute
Wi = Epk(ui) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)
N−1
= Epk(ui ∗ (1− vi))
Γi = Epk(vi − ui) ∗ Epk(rˆi)
= Epk(vi − ui + rˆi)
• If F : v > u, compute:
Wi = Epk(vi) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)
N−1
= Epk(vi ∗ (1 − ui))
Γi = Epk(ui − vi) ∗ Epk(rˆi)
= Epk(ui − vi + rˆi)
where rˆi is a random number in ZN
• Observe that if F : u > v, then Wi = Epk(1) only if ui > vi, and Wi = Epk(0) otherwise. Similarly, when
F : v > u, we have Wi = Epk(1) only if vi > ui, and Wi = Epk(0) otherwise. Also, depending of F , Γi
stores the encryption of randomized difference between ui and vi which will be used in later computations.
• Compute the encrypted bit-wise XOR between the bits ui and vi as Gi = Epk(ui ⊕ vi) using the below
formulation:
Gi = Epk(ui) ∗ Epk(vi) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)
N−2
In general, for any two given bits o1 and o2, we have o1 ⊕ o2 = o1 + o2 − 2(o1 ∗ o2)
• Compute an encrypted vector H by preserving the first occurrence of Epk(1) (if there exists one) in G by
initializing H0 = Epk(0). The rest of the entries of H are computed as Hi = Hrii−1 ∗Gi. We emphasize that at
most one of the entry in H is Epk(1) and the remaining entries are encryptions of either 0 or a random number.
Also, if there exists an index j such that Hj = Epk(1), then index j is the first position (starting from the most
significant bit) at which the corresponding bits of u and v differ.
• Then, P1 computes Φi = Epk(−1) ∗Hi. Note that “−1” is equivalent to “N − 1” under ZN . From the above
discussions, it is clear that Φi = Epk(0) at most once since Hi is equal to Epk(1) at most once. Also, if
Φj = Epk(0), then index j is the position at which the bits of u and v differ first.
• Compute an encrypted vector L by combining W and Φ. Note that Wi stores the result of ui > vi or vi > ui
which depends on F known only to P1. Precisely, P1 computes Li = Wi ∗ Φr
′
i
i , where r′i is a random number
in ZN . The observation here is if ∃ an index j such that Φj = Epk(0), denoting the first flip in the bits of u and
v, then Wj stores the corresponding desired information, i.e., whether uj > vj or vj > uj in encrypted form.
After this, P1 permutes the encrypted vectorsΓ andL using two random permutation functions pi1 and pi2. Specifically,
P1 computes Γ′ = pi1(Γ) and L′ = pi2(L), and sends them to P2. Upon receiving, P2 decrypts L′ component-wise to
get Mi = Dsk(L′i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, and checks for index j (decide the output of F ). That is, if Mj = 1, then the output
of F is 1, and 0 otherwise. Let the output be α. Note that since F is not known to P2, the output α is oblivious to P2.
In addition, P2 computes a new encrypted vector M ′ where M ′i = Γ′i
α
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, sends M ′ and Epk(α) to P1.
After receiving M ′ and Epk(α), P1 computes the inverse permutation of M ′ as M˜ = pi−11 (M ′). Then, P1 performs
the following homomorphic operations to compute the encryption of ith bit of min(u, v), i.e., Epk(min(u, v)i), for
1 ≤ i ≤ l:
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Table 4: P1 chooses F as v > u where u = 55 and v = 58
[u] [v] Wi Γi Gi Hi Φi Li Γi’ L
′
i Mi λi mini
1 1 0 r 0 0 −1 r 1 + r r r 0 1
1 1 0 r 0 0 −1 r r r r 0 1
0 1 1 −1 + r 1 1 0 1 1 + r r r −1 0
1 0 0 1 + r 1 r r r −1 + r r r 1 1
1 1 0 r 0 r r r r 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 + r 1 r r r r r r 1 1
All column values are in encrypted form except Mi column. Also, r ∈R ZN is different for each row and column.
• Remove the randomness from M˜i by computing
λi = M˜i ∗ Epk(α)
N−rˆi
• If F : u > v, compute the ith encrypted bit of min(u, v) as Epk(min(u, v)i) = Epk(ui) ∗ λi = Epk(ui + α ∗
(vi − ui)). Otherwise, compute Epk(min(u, v)i) = Epk(vi) ∗ λi = Epk(vi + α ∗ (ui − vi)).
In the SMIN protocol, one main observation (upon which we can also justify the correctness of the final output) is that
if F : u > v, then min(u, v)i = (1 − α) ∗ ui + α ∗ vi always holds, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Similarly, if F : v > u, then
min(u, v)i = α ∗ ui + (1 − α) ∗ vi always holds.
Example 5. Consider that u = 55, v = 58, and l = 6. Assume thatP1 holds [55] = 〈Epk(1), Epk(1), Epk(0), Epk(1),
Epk(1), Epk(1)〉 and [58] = 〈Epk(1), Epk(1), Epk(1), Epk(0), Epk(1), Epk(0)〉. In addition, we assume that P1’s
random permutation functions are as given below. Without loss of generality, suppose P1 chooses the functionality
i = 1 2 3 4 5 6
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
pi1(i) = 6 5 4 3 2 1
pi2(i) = 2 1 5 6 3 4
F : v > u. Then, various intermediate results based on the SMIN protocol are as shown in Table 4. Following from
Table 4, we observe that:
• At most one of the entry in H is Epk(1) (= H3) and the remaining entries are encryptions of either 0 or a
random number in ZN .
• Index j = 3 is the first position at which the corresponding bits of u and v differ.
• Φ3 = Epk(0) since H3 is equal to Epk(1). Also, since M5 = 1, P2 sets α to 1.
At the end, only P1 knows [min(u, v)] = [u] = [55]. 
Secure Minimum out of n Numbers (SMINn). Consider P1 with private input ([d1], . . . , [dn]) and P2 with sk,
where 0 ≤ di < 2l and [di] = 〈Epk(di,1), . . . , Epk(di,l)〉, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The goal of the SMINn protocol is to
compute [min(d1, . . . , dn)] = [dmin] without revealing any information about di’s to P1 and P2. Here we construct a
new SMINn protocol by utilizing SMIN as the building block. The proposed SMINn protocol is an iterative approach
and it computes the desired output in an hierarchical fashion. In each iteration, minimum between a pair of values is
computed and are feeded as input to the next iteration. Therefore, generating a binary execution tree in a bottom-up
fashion. At the end, only P1 knows the final result [dmin].
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Algorithm 4 SMINn([d1], . . . , [dn])→ [dmin]
Require: P1 has ([d1], . . . , [dn]); P2 has sk
1: P1:
(a). [d′i]← [di], for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(b). num← n
2: P1 and P2, for i = 1 to ⌈log2 n⌉:
(a). for 1 ≤ j ≤ ⌊num2
⌋
:
• if i = 1 then:
– [d′2j−1]← SMIN([d′2j−1], [d′2j ])
– [d′2j ]← 0
else
– [d′2i(j−1)+1]← SMIN([d′2i(j−1)+1], [d′2ij−1])
– [d′2ij−1]← 0
(b). num← ⌈num2
⌉
3: P1:
(a.) [dmin]← [d′1]
The overall steps involved in the proposed SMINn protocol are highlighted in Algorithm 4. Initially, P1 assigns
[di] to a temporary vector [d′i], for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Also, he/she creates a global variable num and initialize it to n, where
num represents the number of (non-zero) vectors involved in each iteration. Since the SMINn protocol executes in
a binary tree hierarchy (bottom-up fashion), we have ⌈log2 n⌉ iterations, and in each iteration, the number of vectors
involved varies. In the first iteration (i.e., i = 1), P1 with private input ([d′2j−1], [d′2j ]) and P2 with sk involve in the
SMIN protocol, for 1 ≤ j ≤
⌊
num
2
⌋
. At the end of the first iteration, only P1 knows [min(d′2j−1, d′2j)] and nothing is
revealed to P2, for 1 ≤ j ≤
⌊
num
2
⌋
. Also, P1 stores the result [min(d′2j−1, d′2j)] in [d′2j−1], updates [d′2j ] to zero and
num to
⌈
num
2
⌉
.
During the ith iteration, only the non-zero vectors are involved, for 2 ≤ i ≤ ⌈log2 n⌉. For example, during second
iteration (i.e., i = 2), only [d′1], [d′3], and so on are involved. Note that in each iteration, the output is revealed only to
P1 and num is updated to
⌈
num
2
⌉
. At the end of the SMINn protocol, P1 assigns the final encrypted binary vector of
global minimum value, i.e., [min(d1, . . . , dn)] which is stored in [d′1] to [dmin].
For example, assume that P1 holds 〈[d1], . . . , [d6]〉 (i.e., n = 6). Then, based on the SMINn protocol, the binary
execution tree (in a bottom-up fashion) to compute [min(d1, . . . , d6)] is as shown in Figure 1. Note that, [d′i] is initially
set to [di], for 1 ≤ i ≤ 6.
Secure Bit-OR (SBOR). Let us assume that P1 holds (Epk(o1), Epk(o2)) and P2 holds sk, where o1 and o2 are
two bits not known to both parties. The goal of the SBOR protocol is to securely compute Epk(o1 ∨ o2). At the end
of this protocol, only P1 knows Epk(o1 ∨ o2). During this process, no information related to o1 and o2 is revealed to
P1 and P2. Given the secure multiplication (SM) protocol, P1 can compute Epk(o1 ∨ o2) as follows:
• P1 with input (Epk(o1), Epk(o2)) and P2 with sk involve in the SM protocol. At the end of this step, the output
Epk(o1 ∗ o2) is known only to P1. Note that, since o1 and o2 are bits, Epk(o1 ∗ o2) = Epk(o1 ∧ o2).
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[dmin]← [min(d
′
1, d
′
5)]
[d′5]
[d′5]← [min(d
′
5, d
′
6)]
[d′6][d
′
5]
[d′1]← [min(d
′
1, d
′
3)]
[d′3] ← [min(d
′
3, d
′
4)]
[d′4][d
′
3]
[d′1]← [min(d
′
1, d
′
2)]
[d′2][d
′
1]
Figure 1: Binary execution tree for n = 6 based on the SMINn protocol
• Epk(o1 ∨ o2) = Epk(o1 + o2) ∗ Epk(o1 ∧ o2)
N−1
.
We emphasize that, for any given two bits o1 and o2, the property o1 ∨ o2 = o1 + o2 − o1 ∧ o2 always holds. Note
that, by homomorphic addition property, Epk(o1 + o2) = Epk(o1) ∗ Epk(o2).
4 The Proposed Protocols
In this section, we first present a basic SkNN protocol and demonstrate why such a simple solution is not secure.
Then, we discuss our second approach, a fully secure kNN protocol. Both protocols are constructed using the security
primitives discussed in Section 3 as building blocks.
As mentioned earlier, we assume that Alice’s database consists of n records, denoted by T = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉, and m
attributes, where ti,j denotes the jth attribute value of record ti. Initially, Alice encrypts her database attribute-wise,
that is, she computes Epk(ti,j), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Let the encrypted database be denoted by Epk(T ).
We assume that Alice outsources Epk(T ) as well as the future query processing service to the cloud. Without loss of
generality, we assume that all attribute values and their Euclidean distances lie in [0, 2l).
In our proposed protocols, we assume the existence of two non-colluding semi-honest cloud service providers,
denoted by C1 and C2, which together form a federated cloud. We emphasize that such an assumption is not new
and has been commonly used in the related problem domains [3, 26]. The intuition behind such an assumption is as
follows. Most of the cloud service providers in the market are well-established IT companies, such as Amazon and
Google. Therefore, a collusion between them is highly unlikely as it will damage their reputation which in turn effects
their revenues.
Under this setting, Alice outsources her encrypted database Epk(T ) to C1 and the secret key sk to C2. The goal
of the proposed protocols is to retrieve the top k records that are closest to the user query in an efficient and secure
manner. Briefly, consider an authorized user Bob who wants to find k records that are closest to his query record
Q = 〈q1, . . . , qm〉 based on Epk(T ) in C1. Bob initially sends his query Q (in encrypted form) to C1. After this, C1
and C2 involve in a set of sub-protocols to securely retrieve (in encrypted form) the set of k records corresponding
to the k-nearest neighbors of the input query Q. At the end of our protocols, only Bob will receive the k-nearest
neighbors to Q as the output.
4.1 Basic Protocol
In the basic secure k-nearest neighbor query protocol, denoted by SkNNb, we relax the desirable properties to produce
an efficient protocol (more details are given in the later part of this section).
The main steps involved in the SkNNb protocol are given in Algorithm 5. Bob initially encrypts his query Q
attribute-wise, that is, he computes Epk(Q) = 〈Epk(q1), . . . , Epk(qm)〉 and sends it to C1. Upon receiving Epk(Q)
from Bob,C1 with private input (Epk(Q), Epk(ti)) andC2 with the secret key sk jointly involve in the SSED protocol,
where Epk(ti) = 〈Epk(ti,1), . . . , Epk(ti,m)〉, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The output of this step, denoted by Epk(di), is the
encryption of squared Euclidean distance between Q and ti, i.e., di = |Q − ti|2. As mentioned earlier, Epk(di) is
known only to C1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We emphasize that computation of exact Euclidean distance between encrypted
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vectors is hard to achieve as it involves square root. However, in our problem, it is sufficient to compare the squared
Euclidean distances as it preserves relative ordering. After this, C1 sends {〈1, Epk(d1)〉 , . . . , 〈n,Epk(dn)〉} to C2,
where entry 〈i, Epk(di)〉 correspond to data record ti, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Upon receiving 〈1, Epk(d1)〉 , . . . , 〈n,Epk(dn)〉,
C2 decrypts the encrypted distance in each entry to get di = Dsk(Epk(di)). Then, C2 generates an index list δ =
〈i1, . . . , ik〉 such that 〈di1 , . . . dik〉 are the top k smallest distances among 〈d1, . . . , dn〉. After this, C2 sends δ to C1.
Upon receiving δ, C1 proceeds as follows:
• Select the encrypted recordsEpk(ti1 ), . . . , Epk(tik) as the k-nearest records to Q and randomize them attribute-
wise. More specifically, C1 computes Epk(γj,h) = Epk(tij ,h) ∗ Epk(rj,h), for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m.
Here rj,h is a random number in ZN and tij ,h denotes the column h attribute value of data record tij . Send γj,h
to C2 and rj,h to Bob, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m.
Upon receiving γj,h, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m, C2 decrypts it to get γ′j,h = Dsk(γj,h) and sends them to Bob.
Note that, due to randomization by C1, γ′j,h is always a random number in ZN .
Finally, upon receiving rj,h from C1 and γ′j,h from C2, Bob computes the attribute values of jth nearest neighbor
to Q as t′j,h = γ
′
j,h − rj,h mod N , for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m. Note that N is the RSA modulus or part of the
public key pk.
4.2 Fully Secure kNN Protocol
The above-mentioned SkNNb protocol reveals the data access patterns to C1 and C2. That is, for any given Q, C1 and
C2 know which data records correspond to the k-nearest neighbors of Q. Also, it reveals di values to C2. However,
leakage of such information may not be acceptable in privacy-sensitive applications such as medical data. Along this
direction, we propose a fully secure protocol, denoted by SkNNm(where m stands for maximally secure), to retrieve
the k-nearest neighbors of Q. The proposed SkNNm protocol preserves all the desirable properties of a secure kNN
protocol as mentioned in Section 1.
The main steps involved in the proposed SkNNm protocol are as shown in Algorithm 6. Initially, Bob sends his
attribute-wise encrypted query Q, that is, Epk(Q) = 〈Epk(q1), . . . , Epk(qm)〉 to C1. Upon receiving, C1 with private
input (Epk(Q), Epk(ti)) and C2 with the secret key sk jointly involve in the SSED protocol. The output of this step
is Epk(di) = Epk(|Q − ti|2) which will be known only to C1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, C1 with input Epk(di) and C2
with sk securely compute the encryptions of the individual bits of di using the SBD protocol. Note that the output of
this step [di] = 〈Epk(di,1), . . . , Epk(di,l)〉 is known only to C1, where di,1 and di,l are the most and least significant
bits of di respectively. Note that 0 ≤ di < 2l, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
After this, C1 and C2 compute the top k (in encrypted form) records that are closest to Q in an iterative manner.
More specifically, they compute Epk(t′1) in the first iteration, Epk(t′2) in the second iteration, and so on. Here t′s de-
notes the sth nearest neighbor to Q, for 1 ≤ s ≤ k. At the end of k iterations, only C1 knows 〈Epk(t′1), . . . , Epk(t′k)〉.
To start with, in the first iteration, C1 and C2 jointly compute the encryptions of the individual bits of the minimum
value among d1, . . . , dn using SMINn. That is, C1 with input 〈[d1], . . . , [dn]〉 and C2 compute [dmin], where dmin
is the minimum value among d1, . . . , dn. The output [dmin] is known only to C1. Now, C1 performs the following
operations locally:
• Compute the encryption of dmin from its encrypted individual bits as below
Epk(dmin) =
l−1∏
γ=0
Epk(dmin,γ+1)
2l−γ−1
= Epk(dmin,1 ∗ 2
l−1 + · · ·+ dmin,l)
where dmin,1 and dmin,l are the most and least significant bits of dmin respectively.
• Compute the encryption of difference between dmin and each di. That is, C1 computes τi = Epk(dmin) ∗
Epk(di)
N−1 = Epk(dmin − di), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Algorithm 5 SkNNb(Epk(T ), Q)→ 〈t′1, . . . , t′k〉
Require: C1 has Epk(T ); C2 has sk; Bob has Q
1: Bob:
(a). Compute Epk(qj), for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
(b). Send Epk(Q) = 〈Epk(q1), . . . , Epk(qm)〉 to C1
2: C1 and C2:
(a). C1 receives Epk(Q) from Bob
(b). for i = 1 to n do:
• Epk(di)← SSED(Epk(Q), Epk(ti))
(c). Send {〈1, Epk(d1)〉 , . . . , 〈n,Epk(dn)〉} to C2
3: C2:
(a). Receive {〈1, Epk(d1)〉 , . . . , 〈n,Epk(dn)〉} from C1
(b). di ← Dsk(Epk(di)), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(c). Generate δ ← 〈i1, . . . , ik〉, such that 〈di1 , . . . , dik 〉 are the top k smallest distances among 〈d1, . . . , dn〉
(d). Send δ to C1
4: C1:
(a). Receive δ from C2
(b). for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m do:
• γj,h ← Epk(tij ,h) ∗ Epk(rj,h), where rj,h ∈R ZN
• Send γj,h to C2 and rj,h to Bob
5: C2:
(b). for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m do:
• Receive γj,h from C1
• γ′j,h ← Dsk(γj,h); send γ′j,h to Bob
6: Bob:
(a). for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m do:
• Receive rj,h from C1 and γ′j,h from C2
• t′j,h ← γ
′
j,h − rj,h mod N
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• Randomize τi to get τ ′i = τ
ri
i = Epk(ri ∗ (dmin − di)), where ri is a random number in ZN . Note that τ ′i is
an encryption of either 0 or a random number, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Also, permute τ ′ using a random permutation
function pi (known only to C1) to get β = pi(τ ′) and send it to C2.
Upon receiving β, C2 decrypts it component-wise to get β′i = Dsk(βi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. After this, he/she computes an
encrypted vector U of length n such that Ui = Epk(1) if β′i = 0, and Epk(0) otherwise. Here we assume that exactly
one of the entries in β equals to zero and rest of them are random. This further implies that exactly one of the entries
in U is an encryption of 1 and rest of them are encryptions of 0’s. However, we emphasize that if β′ has more than one
0’s, then C2 can randomly pick one of those indexes and assign Epk(1) to the corresponding index of U and Epk(0)
to the rest. Then, C2 sends U to C1. After receiving U , C1 performs inverse permutation on it to get V = pi−1(U).
Note that exactly one of the entry in V is Epk(1) and the remaining are encryption of 0’s. In addition, if Vi = Epk(1),
then ti is the closest record to Q. However, C1 and C2 do not know which entry in V corresponds to Epk(1).
Finally, C1 computes Epk(t′1), encryption of the closest record to Q, and updates the distance vectors as follows:
• C1 and C2 jointly involve in the secure multiplication (SM) protocol to compute V ′i,j = Vi ∗ Epk(ti,j), for
1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. The output V ′ from the SM protocol is known only to C1. After this, by using
homomorphic properties, C1 computes the encrypted record Epk(t′1) = 〈Epk(t1,1), . . . , Epk(t1,m)〉 locally,
Epk(t
′
1,j) =
∏n
i=1 V
′
i,j , where 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Note that t′1,j denotes the jth attribute value of record t′1.
• It is important to note that the first nearest tuple to Q should be obliviously excluded from further computations.
However, since C1 does not know the record corresponding to Epk(t′1), we need to obliviously eliminate the
possibility of choosing this record again in next iterations. For this, C1 obliviously updates the distance corre-
sponding to Epk(t′1) to the maximum value, i.e., 2l− 1. More specifically, C1 updates the distance vectors with
the help of C2 using the SBOR protocol as below, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ γ ≤ l.
Epk(di,γ) = SBOR(Vi, Epk(di,γ))
Note that when Vi = Epk(1), the corresponding distance vector di is set to the maximum value. That is, under
this case, [di] = 〈Epk(1), . . . , Epk(1)〉. However, when Vi = Epk(0), the OR operation has no affect on di.
The above process is repeated until k iterations, and in each iteration [di] corresponding to the current chosen record is
set to the maximum value. However, since C1 does not know which [di] is updated, he/she has to re-computeEpk(di)
in each iteration using their corresponding encrypted binary vectors [di], for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In iteration s, Epk(t′s) is
known only to C1.
At the end of the iterative step (i.e., step 3 of Algorithm 6), C1 has 〈Epk(t′1), . . . , Epk(t′k)〉 - the list of encrypted
records of k-nearest neighbors to the input query Q. The rest of the process is similar to steps 4 to 6 of Algorithm 5.
Briefly, C1 randomizes Epk(t′j) attribute-wise to get γj,h = Epk(t′j,h) ∗ Epk(rj,h) and sends γj,h to C2 and rj,h to
Bob, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m. Here rj,h is a random number in ZN . Upon receiving γj,h’s, C2 decrypts them
to get the randomized k-nearest records as γ′j,h = Dsk(γj,h) and sends them to Bob, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m.
Finally, upon receiving rj,h from C1 and γ′j,h from C2, Bob computes the jth nearest neighboring record to Q, as
t′j,h = γ
′
j,h − rj,h mod N , for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ h ≤ m.
4.3 Security Analysis
Here we analyze the security guarantees of the proposed protocols. First, due to the encryption of Q and by semantic
security of the Paillier cryptosystem, Bob’s input query Q is protected from Alice, C1 and C2 in both protocols.
In the SkNNb protocol, the decryption operations at step 3(b) of Algorithm 5 reveal di values to C2. In addition,
since C2 generates the top k index list (at step 3(c) of Algorithm 5) and sends it to C1, the data access patterns are
revealed to C1 and C2. Therefore, our basic SkNNb protocol is secure under the assumption that di values can be
revealed to C2 and data access patterns can be revealed to C1 and C2.
On the other hand, the security analysis of SkNNm is as follows. At step 2 of Algorithm 6, the outputs of SSED
and SBD are in encrypted format, and are known only to C1. In addition, all the intermediate results decrypted by C2
in SSED are uniformly random in ZN . Also, as mentioned in [21], the SBD protocol is secure. Thus, no information is
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Algorithm 6 SkNNm(Epk(T ), Q)→ 〈t′1, . . . , t′k〉
Require: C1 has Epk(T ) and pi; C2 has sk; Bob has Q
1: Bob sends Epk(Q) = 〈Epk(q1), . . . , Epk(qm)〉 to C1
2: C1 and C2:
(a). for i = 1 to n do:
• Epk(di)← SSED(Epk(Q), Epk(ti)) and [di]← SBD(Epk(di))
3: for s = 1 to k do:
(a). C1 and C2:
• [dmin]← SMINn([d1], . . . , [dn])
(b). C1:
• Epk(dmin) ←
∏l−1
γ=0Epk(dmin,γ+1)
2l−γ−1
• if s 6= 1 then, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
– Epk(di) ←
∏l−1
γ=0Epk(di,γ+1)
2l−γ−1
• for i = 1 to n do:
– τi ← Epk(dmin) ∗ Epk(di)
N−1
– τ ′i ← τ
ri
i , where ri ∈R ZN
• β ← pi(τ ′); send β to C2
(c). C2:
• β′i ← Dsk(βi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
• Compute U , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
– if β′i = 0 then Ui = Epk(1)
– else Ui = Epk(0)
• Send U to C1
(d). C1:
• V ← pi−1(U)
• V ′i,j ← SM(Vi, Epk(ti,j)), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m
• Epk(t
′
s,j)←
∏n
i=1 V
′
i,j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
• Epk(t
′
s) = 〈Epk(t
′
s,1), . . . , Epk(t
′
s,m)〉
(e). C1 and C2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
• Epk(di,γ)← SBOR(Vi, Epk(di,γ)), for 1 ≤ γ ≤ l
The rest of the steps are similar to steps 4-6 of SkNNb
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revealed during step 2 of Algorithm 6. In each iteration, the output of SMINn is known only to C1 and no information
is revealed to C2. Also, C1 and C2 do not know which record belongs to current global minimum. Thus, data access
patterns are protected from both C1 and C2. At step 3(c) of Algorithm 6, a component-wise decryption of β reveals
the tuples that satisfy the current global minimum distance to C2. However, due to permutation by C1, C2 cannot
trace back to the corresponding data records. Also, note that decryption of β gives either encryptions of 0’s or random
numbers in ZN . Similarly, since U is an encrypted vector, C1 cannot know which tuple corresponds to current global
minimum distance. Thus, data access patterns are further protected at this step fromC1. In addition, the update process
at step 3(e) of Algorithm 6 does not leak any information to C1 and C2. In summary, C1 and C2 do not know which
data records correspond to the output set 〈t′1, . . . , t′k〉.
Based on the above discussions, it is clear that the proposed SkNNm protocol protects the confidentiality of the
data, privacy of user’s input query, and hides the data access patterns.
4.4 Complexity Analysis
The computation complexity of SkNNb is bounded by O(n ∗m + k) encryptions, decryptions and exponentiations.
In practice k ≪ n ∗m; therefore, the computation complexity of SkNNb is bounded by O(n ∗m) encryptions and
exponentiations (assuming that encryption and decryption operations under Paillier cryptosystem take similar amount
of time).
In the SkNNm protocol, the computation complexity is bounded by O(n) instantiations of SBD and SSED, O(k)
instantiations of SMINn, and O(n ∗ l) instantiations of SBOR. We emphasize that the computation complexity of
the SBD protocol proposed in [21] is bounded by O(l) encryptions and O(l) exponentiations. Also, the computation
complexity of SSED is bounded by O(m) encryptions and O(m) exponentiations. In addition, the computation
complexity of SMINn is bounded by O(l ∗n∗ log2 n) encryptions and O(l ∗n∗ log2 n) exponentiations. Since SBOR
utilizes SM as a sub-routine, the computation cost of SBOR is bounded by (small) constant number of encryptions and
exponentiations. Based on the above analysis, the total computation complexity of the SkNNm protocol is bounded by
O(n ∗ (l +m+ k ∗ l ∗ log2 n)) encryptions and exponentiations.
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we discuss the performances of the proposed protocols in detail under different parameter settings. We
used Paillier cryptosystem [18] and implemented the proposed protocols in C. Various experiments were conducted
on a Linux machine with an Intel R© Xeon R© Six-CoreTM CPU 3.07 GHz processor and 12GB RAM running Ubuntu
10.04 LTS.
Since it is difficult to control the parameters in a real dataset, we randomly generated synthetic datasets depending
on the parameter values in consideration. Using these synthetic datasets we can perform a more elaborated analysis
on the computation costs of the proposed protocols under different parameter settings. We encrypted these datasets
attribute-wise, using the Paillier encryption whose key size is varied in our experiments, and the encrypted data were
stored on our machine. Based on the protocols protocols, we then executed a random query over this encrypted data.
For the rest of this section, we do not discuss about the performance of Alice since it is a one-time cost. Instead, we
evaluate and analyze the performances of SkNNb and SkNNm separately. In addition, we compare the two protocols.
In all our experiments, the Paillier encryption key size, denoted by K , is set to either 512 or 1024 bits.
5.1 Performance of SkNNb
In this sub-section, we analyze the computation costs of SkNNb by varying the number of data records (n), number of
attributes (m), number of nearest neighbors (k), and encryption key size (K). Note that SkNNb is independent of the
domain size of attributes (l).
First, by fixing k = 5 and K = 512, we evaluated the computation costs of SkNNb for varying n and m. As
shown in Figure 2(a), the computation costs of SkNNb grows linearly with n and m. For example, when m = 6, the
computation time of SkNNb increases from 44.08 to 87.91 seconds when n is varied from 2000 to 4000. A similar
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(a) SkNNb for k = 5 and K = 512
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(b) SkNNb for k = 5 and K = 1024
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(c) SkNNb for m = 6 and n = 2000
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(d) SkNNm for n = 2000 and K = 512
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(e) SkNNm for n = 2000 and K = 1024
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Figure 2: Time complexities of SkNNb and SkNNm for varying values of n, m, l, k and encryption key size K
trend is observed for K = 1024 as shown in Figure 2(b). For any fixed parameters, we observed that the computation
time of SkNNb increases almost by a factor of 7 when K is doubled.
Next, by fixing m = 6 and n = 2000, we evaluated the running times of SkNNb for varying k and K . The results
are shown in Figure 2(c). Irrespective of K , the computation time of SkNNb does not change much with varying k.
This is because most of the cost in SkNNb comes from the SSED protocol which is independent of k. E.g., when
K = 512 bits, the computation time of SkNNb changes from 44.08 to 44.14 seconds when k is changed from 5 to 25.
Based on the above discussions, it is clear that the running time of SkNNb mainly depends on (or grows linearly with)
n and m which further justifies our complexity analysis in Section 4.4.
5.2 Performance of SkNNm
We also evaluated the computation costs of SkNNm for varying values of k, l and K . Throughout this sub-section, we
fix m = 6 and n = 2000. However, we observed that the running time of SkNNm grows linearly with n and m.
For K = 512 bits, the computation costs of SkNNm for varying k and l are as shown in Figure 2(d). Following
from Figure 2(d), for l = 6, the running time of SkNNm varies from 11.93 to 55.65 minutes when k is changed from 5
to 25 respectively. Also, for l = 12, the running time of SkNNm varies from 20.68 to 97.8 minutes when k is changed
from 5 to 25 respectively. In either case, the cost of SkNNm grows almost linearly with k and l.
A similar trend is observed for K = 1024 as shown in Figure 2(e). In particular, for any given fixed parameters,
we identified that the computation cost of SkNNm increases by almost a factor of 7 when K is doubled. For example,
when k = 10, SkNNm took 22.85 and 157.17 minutes to generate the 10 nearest neighbors of Q under K = 512 and
1024 bits respectively. Furthermore, when k = 5, we observed that around 69.7% of cost in SkNNm is accounted due to
SMINn which is initiated k times in SkNNm (once in each iteration). Also, the cost incurred due to SMINn increases
from 69.7% to at least 75% when k is increased from 5 to 25.
In addition, by fixing n = 2000,m = 6, l = 6 and K = 512, we compared the running times of both protocols
for varying values of k. As shown in Figure 2(f), the running time of SkNNb remains to be constant at 0.73 minutes
since it is almost independent of k. However, the running time of SkNNm changes from 11.93 to 55.65 minutes as we
increase k from 5 to 25.
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Figure 3: Comparison of parallel and serial versions of SkNNb for m = 6, k = 5 and K = 512 bits
Based on the above results, it is clear that the computation costs of SkNNm are significantly higher than that of
SkNNb. However, we emphasize that SkNNm is more secure than SkNNb; therefore, the two protocols act as a trade-
off between security and efficiency. Also, it is important to note that Bob’s computation cost is mainly due to the
encryption of his input query record. As an example, for m = 6, Bob’s computation costs are 4 and 17 milliseconds
when K is 512 and 1024 bits respectively. This further shows that our proposed protocols are very efficient from
end-user’s perspective.
5.3 Towards Performance Improvement
At first, it seems that the proposed protocols are costly and may not scale well for large datasets. However, in both
protocols, we emphasize that the computations involved on each data record are independent of others. Therefore, we
can parallelize the operations on data records for efficiency purpose. To further justify this claim, we implemented
a parallel version of our SkNNb protocol using OpenMP programming and compared its computation costs with its
serial version. As mentioned earlier, our machine has 6 cores which can be used to perform parallel operations on 6
threads. For m = 6, k = 5 and K = 512 bits, the comparison results are as shown in Figure 3. The observation is
that the parallel version of SkNNb is roughly 6 times more efficient than its serial version. This is because of the fact
that the parallel version can execute operations on 6 data records at a time (i.e., on 6 threads in parallel). For example,
when n = 10000, the running times of parallel and serial versions of SkNNb are 40 and 215.59 seconds respectively.
We believe that similar efficiency gains can be achieved by parallelizing the operations in SkNNm. Based on
the above discussions, especially in a cloud computing environment where high performance parallel processing can
easily be achieved, we claim that the scalability issue of the proposed protocols can be eliminated or mitigated. In
addition, using the existing map-reduce techniques, we can drastically improve the performance further by executing
parallel operations on multiple nodes. We will leave this analysis to future work.
6 Conclusion
Query processing is an important task in database management systems. In particular, k-nearest neighbors is one
of the commonly used query in many data mining applications such as detection of fraud by credit card companies
and prediction of tumor cells levels in blood. With the recent growth of cloud computing as a new IT paradigm,
data owners are more interested to outsource their databases as well as DBMS functionalities to the cloud. Under
an outsourced database environment, where encrypted data are stored in the cloud, secure query processing over
encrypted data becomes challenging. To protect user privacy, various secure k-nearest neighbor (SkNN) techniques
have been proposed in the literature. However, the existing SkNN techniques over encrypted data are not secure.
Along this direction, we proposed two novel SkNN protocols over encrypted data in the cloud. The first protocol,
which acts as a basic solution, leaks some information to the cloud. On the other hand, our second protocol is fully
secure, that is, it protects the confidentiality of the data, user’s input query, and also hides the data access patterns.
However, the second protocol is more expensive compared to the basic protocol. Also, we evaluated the performance
of our protocols under different parameter settings. As a future work, we will investigate and extend our research to
other complex conjuctive queries over encrypted data.
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